Friday, May 31, 2013

Improving Pakistan economy, not peace with India will be Sharif's priority

From The Diplomat


By Nitin A. Gokhale

The recent election of Nawaz Sharif raises hopes, but hardliners in both countries remain a hurdle.
International_border_at_Wagah_-_evening_flag_lowering_ceremony
In January this year, U.S. think tank the New America Foundation played host to 30-odd Indians and Pakistanis in Dubai. The idea was to share knowledge and ideas, understand prevailing challenges and issues, identify common points of collaboration, and collectively suggest the next steps for policy, strategy, research, and action.
Delegates to the closed-door conference included representatives from the military, public and private institutes, think tanks, media, and non-profit organizations.
The conversations covered issues of common interest to the two countries, including trade, business, microfinance, IT, water, energy, climate change, public health, security, and media. This writer was part of the conference as a delegate from India.
Hosted by well-known authors and journalists Steve Coll and Peter Bergen, the two-day conference came up with the following key recommendations:
· Facilitate cross-border exchange visits, both academic and person-to-person. 
· In terms of academia, organize trans-border inter-collegiate exchange programs. 
· Geographically, foster interaction across cities in the border states. 
· Provide a platform for collaborative research between various actors in Pakistan and India. This may involve a joint think tank or cross-border research on issues such as energy, trade, and microfinance.
Five months later, Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan's Prime Minister-in-waiting, after winning the landmark elections held on 11 May, is speaking along similar lines. He wants to increase bilateral trade with India to improve Pakistan's own economy, push for more people to people contacts and is in favor of a more liberalized visa regime.
Nawaz Sharif also wants lasting peace with India, reprising an effort he made in 1999. In fact, in one of the first media interactions after his election victory, Sharif told reporters: "“We will pick up the threads from where we left in 1999… That is the roadmap that I have for improvement of relations between Pakistan and India.”
In interview after interview with Indian journalists, Nawaz's central theme was his wish and plan for normal relations with India. Indian media and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government also hailed Nawaz Sharif's victory. Singh has made peace with Pakistan one of his “core” themes during his nine years in office, despite a brazen attack by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiyba (LeT) terrorists on the commercial city of Mumbai in November 2008 that left over 160 people dead. Singh immediately sent Sharif a message congratulating him on the election win: "… “(people of India) welcome your publicly articulated commitment to a relationship between India and Pakistan that is defined by peace, friendship and cooperation.”
Both Singh and Sharif will, however, have to contend with hardliners back home before they can make any moves to reduce the existing trust deficit between the two countries. 
In Pakistan, in particular, no civilian leader has been able to practice an India policy independent of the country's powerful military. Last time, in 1999, Nawaz Sharif tried to break new ground by initiating a friendship bus that travelled from Delhi to Lahore. A new era, it seemed, was about to begin.
Within months, however, Pakistan Army then led by Gen Pervez Musharraf, sabotaged the initiative by sending troops into Indian-held Kashmir, which led to the Kargil conflict. Musharraf’s ploy of dressing up Pakistan Army regulars as Mujahideens (Freedom fighters) was exposed once the Indian Army began to push back the intruders. US President Bill Clinton summoned Sharif to Washington and asked to withdraw the Pakistani Army troops from Kargil even as the Indians gained the upper hand. A humiliated Sharif returned home only to be ousted through a bloodless coup by Musharraf. The Saudis negotiated Sharif’s exile.
Today, the tables have turned. Sharif has won a popular mandate but Pervez Musharraf – after a longish stint as Pakistan’s chief executive, first as Army chief and then as President – had to flee Pakistan. When he returned a month before the May 11 election, hoping to recapture the imagination of the nation, the former dictator was arrested on court orders. Ultimately, the Pakistani Army may bail Musharraf out. Sharif may not mind that since he has bigger battles to fight than to think of revenge against his former tormentor.
Sharif’s biggest challenge will be to get the Pakistani Army on the same page. Already there are reports that Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani has had a long meeting with Sharif and advised him to go slow on his desire to renew détente with India. The GHQ in Rawalpindi may also be unhappy with Sharif’s post-election announcement that he is open to launching an investigation into the planning and conspiracy of the November 2008 Mumbai attack, widely attributed to LeT. Sharif’s stand on the 2008 attack will bring him in direct confrontation with the LeT, considered one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the world now. Like Sharif’s own political party, the LeT’s base is the Punjab province, Pakistan’s largest and politically most powerful region. Sharif therefore may not want to take the LeT head on just yet.
Moreover, the Pakistani Army and especially its spy arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) will also resist any such move since it treats LeT  and other smaller terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohhamed (JeM) as strategic assets against India. Many of LeT’s foot soldiers are often trained, armed and sent into Indian-administered Kashmir by the ISI to keep the Kashmir dispute between the two countries simmering. For over 60 years, maintaining adversarial posture against India has been the very raison d'être of the Pakistani Army and it is not going to change its stance no matter how resounding the democratic verdict is for Nawaz Sharif.
Perhaps learning a lesson or two from his earlier stints as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif may want to take it one at a time and not antagonize the Pakistani Army upfront. Writing in The Daily Times, columnist Mohammad Taqi made an interesting point. “From his exile on December 10, 2000 to his eventual return on November 25, 2007 he has had plenty of time to reflect and mellow. The trigger-happy Mr Nawaz Sharif of the 1990s who fired two army chiefs within a year seems to be taking great pains to project patience. A well-earned confidence has replaced his pre-May 11 jitteriness. Personal residence at Raiwind — not the Muslim League Secretariat, Islamabad or even Lahore — chosen as the hub of all post-election activity by Mr Sharif should leave little doubt about where the command and control of his eponymous Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) is.”
Patience apart, Nawaz Sharif will have to show urgency on several basic domestic issues. The Pakistani economy is in the doldrums and the country is plagued by perpetual energy shortages. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, much against conventional wisdom, has offered to supply electricity to Pakistan. There are renewed attempts now to boost India-Pakistan bilateral trade too.
However, the biggest challenge for both New Delhi and Islamabad could come from the fast-changing situation in a third country—Afghanistan. As American and ISAF forces prepare for a drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014, there are growing security concerns about a possible resurgence of Taliban and Pakistani Army’s complicity in propping up these groups.
Growing friction between troops of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Taliban insurgents around the Durand line that divides Afghanistan and Pakistan may have prompted President Hamid Karzai to seek direct military help from India during his visit to India last week. Karzai in fact openly told Indian media that he had presented a wish list to the Indians without elaborating on what he sought. But sources in Indian security establishment have revealed Karzai wanted transport helicopters, light artillery and ammunition from New Delhi, apart from stepping up training for ANA troops.
India has so far not revealed its hand about supplying military hardware to Afghanistan, with opinion among strategic thinkers divided. Some advocate immediate supply of weapons to facilitate conversion of the ANA from a light infantry-type force into an army capable of holding its own against a likely onslaught by the Taliban. Others favor continuation of the current Indian policy: aid in reconstruction and in civilian areas combined with training for ANA troops within India. Both camps agree, however, that there should be no Indian boots on the ground in Afghanistan since that is a red line for Pakistan. Watching Indian moves very closely will be the Pakistani Army, which regards any Indian presence in Afghanistan as a threat to its need for a “strategic depth” in the event of a military showdown with India.
Despite the Pakistan Army’s reservations, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has for long articulated a need for normal relations with Islamabad, arguing that a stable Pakistan is in India’s long-term interest. In so doing, he has raised the hackles of many Indians. His attempt to convert the Siachen Glacier – described as the world’s highest battlefield – into a “peace park” has run into fierce opposition, mainly from the Indian Army, which otherwise submits to total civilian control over its affairs. The Indian Army leadership has reminded the prime minister and other civilian leaders that the Kargil conflict of 1999 happened primarily because Pakistan wanted to seize Siachen from Indian control.
Terrorism emanating from Pakistan is another thorny issue. Although the Indian prime minister walked the extra mile after the 2008 Mumbai attack, Pakistan has so far failed to bring the mastermind of that attack, LeT founder Mohammed Hafeez Saeed and his associates to book for their role in the brazen assault, limiting Singh’s ability to sell his peace agenda to Indians. The ISI continues to run terror campsalong the border in Kashmir and periodically sends well-armed terrorists to disrupt hard-earned peace in the Kashmir Valley. With general elections in India due in less than a year, the current government cannot afford to be seen compromising the country’s interest with Pakistan.
Even for Nawaz Sharif, consolidating his grip on government will depend on three crucial events coming up in the next eight months: the end of President Asif Ali Zardari’s term; the appointment of a new Chief Justice of Pakistan and choosing a successor to General Kayani (if indeed he chooses to retire in November at the end of his extended term).
Sharif’s challenge will be to create the right balance with the army and deliver on the election promises he made to the citizens of Pakistan. Economic recovery and controlling domestic terrorism will be high priorities. As for India, both countries have tried to come to terms with each other over the past six decades, without ever succeeding fully, so a durable peace can wait a little longer.
(Nitin A. Gokhale is Security & Strategic Affairs Editor with Indian Boradcaster NDTV)

Saturday, May 25, 2013

Build deterrence against China, stitch alliances with its adversaries: My prescription

Last week in Pune, friends wanted me to share my experience and thoughts on india-china relationship in the context of recent incursion in ladakh and premier li's india visit. some friends who couldn't come wanted me to upload the power point presentations. here's an excerpt of those two talks with some photographs. each talk was of an hour followed by 30-45 mins of interaction. 




CHINA’S EXPANSIONISM AND ITS EFFECT ON THE WORLD

      SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEA DISPUTES
           CHINA HAS DISPUTES WITH ALMOST ALL COUNTRIES AROUND THE    SOUTH CHINA SEA, EAST CHINA SEA
            GULF OF TONKIN: CHINA AND VIETNAM
             NATUNA ISLANDS: INDONESIA, CHINA, TAIWAN
             SPARTLY  AND PARACEL ISLANDS: PHILIPPINES, VIETNAM, MALAYSIA, TAIWAN AND CHINA
              SENKAKU ISLANDS:  JAPAN AND CHINA
                                       SOUTH CHINA SEA 
•        CHINA IS STAEDILY PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES AND KEEPING ALMOST ALL NEIGHBOURS  OFF-BALANCE
•         VIETNAM,  JAPAN, PHILIPPINES  ALL HAVE ISSUES WITH CHINA’S EXPANSIONIST  DESIGNS
 RICH IN MINERALS AND OIL, STAKES ARE HIGH IN S. CHINA SEA WATERS
 INDIA HAS BACKED DOWN FROM EXPLORING OIL
  PHILIPPINES AND VIETNAM CONTINUE TO SPAR WITH CHINA IN                                                      S. CHINA SEA
INDIAN GOVT PERFIDY
To my left Lt. Gen DB Shekatkar, one of my gurus
TILL  MID-1950S CHINA HAD  NEVER DISPUTED 
INDIA’S  BOUNDARY CLAIMS IN LADAKH
HOWEVER  FROM 1958 IT STARTED CLAIMING PARTS 
OF AKSAI CHIN ON MILITARY  GROUNDS
BUILT  ROADS, INFRASTRUCTURE, GARRISONS
1959: IT WROTE A LETTER  EXPLAINING WHY
NEHRU SAID NOT A BLADE OF GRASS GROWS THERE
•         CHINA WANTED FULL CONTROL OVER TIBET &
             XINJIANG  & THEREFORE A CONNECTING ROAD


               THE GROUND REALITY
           CHINA  HAS  STEADILY  PUSHED BOUNDARY  WEST  TOWARD  SHYOK INCREASING PRESSURE ON SIACHEN
•        DEPSANG , DBO ARE PART OF SUB-SECTOR NORTH
•         THIS IS WEDGED BETWEEN AKSAI CHIN IN THE EAST AND  POK IN THE WEST
•         WEST OF KARAKORAM PASS AT POINT 6599, CHINA HAS CONTROL OVER TERRITORY CEDED BY PAK
•          CHINA IS WORRIED ABOUT XINJIANG AND INDIA’S   ACCESS TO CENTRAL ASIA THRU THIS SMALL PATCH


        WHY DEPSANG
AROUND DBO THERE ARE TWO CRUCIAL AREAS: TRIG HEIGHTS AND BURTSE/DEPSANG PLAINS
2005: 50 INTRUSIONS; 2009: 70 INTRUSIONS
BUILT 5 KM ROAD FROM JAK II INSIDE INDIAN AREA
2011: BUILT 30 KM ROAD INSIDE INDIAN AREA ALONG RAKKI NALLAH,
2013:REINFORCED CLAIMS TO THE AREA BY PUTTING TENTS & FORCING INDIA TO STOP PATROLLING
        (SOURCE: FORMER SPECIAL DIRECTOR IB, RN RAVI)     
                                                             


         CHINESE APPROACH TO BORDERS
       •CHINA HAS 14 LAND BORDERS  & 8 MARITIME BOUNDARIES; ONLY RUSSIA HAS MORE  Nos.
       •BEIJING HAS SETTLED 12 OF THE 14 LAND BOUNDARIES EXCEPT WITH INDIA, BHUTAN
       •SETTLEMENTS CAME AT THE TIME OF CHINA’S CHOOSING, WITH DECLINING NATION-STATES  
       •WITH INDIA, IT HAS KEPT UP THE PRETENCE OF ENGAGEMENT WITHOUT SUBSTANCE
         •MANMOHAN SINGH HAS FOR THE FIRST TIME SAID BORDER DISPUTE IS A CORE ISSUE

In the audience Mrs Meghna &Air Marshal BN Gokhale, ex vice chief of IAF
WHERE ARE WE AT THE MOMENT
15 ROUNDS OF SR LEVEL TALKS CONCLUDED
WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS
BOTH SIDES HAVE STUCK TO THEIR  POSITIONS
•  INCREASING ASSERTIVE CHINESE ROLE IN PAK-OCCUPIED KASHMIR IS A NEW ELEMENT
CHINA KEEPS INDIA STRATEGICALLY ENGAGED IN TRADE  BUT TACTICALLY OFF BALANCE 
•     INDIAN DIFFIDENCE STEMS FROM EVENTS OF 1962?
    CHINA'S SOUTH ASIA FOCUS
STEADY INCREASE IN MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT AID TO SRI LANKA EVEN AFTER END OF WAR

        •LONG-STANDING RELATIONSHIP WITH BANGLADESH
        •HAD HUGE INFLUENCE IN MYANMAR BUT SOME PROBLEMS  CROPPING UP OF LATE
        •IN NEPAL , SEVERAL CHINA STUDY CENTRES HAVE CROPPED UP ALONG INDIA BORDER
           •MAKING INROADS INTO BHUTAN TOO

 'HIGHER THAN HIMALAYAS, DEEPER THAN THE INDIAN OCEEAN
 •GWADAR’S HANDING OVER SIGNIFICANT  
PREMIER LI ANNOUNCED NEW AIRPORT AT GWADAR, LINKS TO REST OF PAK
 •UPGRADE  OF KARAKORAM HIGHWAY
DEVELOPMENT OF 1000 MW HYDRO POWER PROJECT IN PAK-OCCUPIED KASHMIR  •CHINESE SUPPLY OF MILITARY HARDWARE, FIGHTER JETS  TO PAK CONTINUES 
WHAT SHOULD INDIA DO?

TRUST BUT VERIFY PRINCIPLE; CONFRONT CHINA ON UNCOMFORTABLE QUESTIONS, ISSUES
INSIST ON MAP EXCHANGE; RENEW BORDER TALKS
RAPID INFRASTRUCTURE BUILD UP, BEEF UP MILITARY WHEREWITHAL WITHOUT FANFARE
BUILD A MORE POWERFUL NAVY
PREPARE THE COUNTRY FOR EVENTUAL SOLUTION
BUILD PARTNERSHIPS WITH CHINA’S ADVERSARIES, DO A REVERSE STRING OF PEARLS

Thursday, May 9, 2013

India-China: Looking back to re-imagine the future

Almost exactly four years ago, the outgoing UPA-I government's Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) was meeting for the last time before the results of the 2009 general elections were to be announced. The sole item on the agenda: Enhancing India's military preparedness against China.

According to insiders present at that meeting, some of the members of the CCS wanted to leave the decision to the next government but better sense prevailed and days before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's first UPA government went ahead and sanctioned raising of two new Mountain Divisions for deployment in India's north eastern State of Arunachal Pradesh, an area claimed by China as South Tibet. In addition, the Indian Air Force was given the go ahead to reactivate half a dozen Advance Landing Grounds (ALGs) spread all along the Arunachal-Tibet portion of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries and base additional squadrons of Sukhoi-30 combat jets in Assam.

The goal was to plug existing gaps in India’s preparedness along the Arunachal Pradesh-China frontier. The two new divisions were to include a squadron of India’s armoured spearhead—Soviet-built T-90 tanks--and a regiment of artillery. 


Now four years later, the two mountain divisions have completed their recruitment, equipping and orbatting in the North-east. One of them--the 56 Mountain Division--after being raised in Nagaland's Zakhama area has been placed at Lekhabali, north of the Brahmaputra adding teeth to Indian Army's presence in East and Central Arunachal Pradesh. The other new Division--71--headquartered at Missamari in the plains of Assam, will enhance troop deployment beyond Tawang in West Arunachal Pradesh in addition to the 5 Mountain Division already stationed at Tenga.

However one lacunae continues to persist. Road links to forward areas remain tenuous  The China Study Group (CSG), which controls India's policy on China had sanctioned 72 tactically important roads to be built in the tough, mountainous terrain along the China border in the Eastern and the Western sectors. The roads are being built by the quasi-military Border Roads Organisation to enhance connectivity. But a combination of lethargic BRO, obstructionist state governments and ministry of environment and forests has meant that these roads are nowhere near completion. Similarly, the half a dozen ALGs in Arunachal Pradesh are also stuck in red tape (See this: 
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/india-matters/recalling-1962-50-years-on/251438)

The recent incursion by Chinese troops in Ladakh's Depsang area should serve as a timely reminder to the government that timelines for infrastructure development along the Chinese frontier and plans to boost military capability do not have the luxury of slippages.

Diplomacy and timing (cancellation of Chinese Premier's visit over the border standoff would have been a loss of face for Beijing) helped end the face off this time but New Delhi will do well to remember such incident is not going to be one off. The Chinese will continue to nibble at the undemarcated border and test India's response as they have done for over 50 years See this oo: http://nitinagokhale.blogspot.in/2013/04/india-china-standoff-journey-to-tawang.html)

In this context it is instructive to take a peep into what happened in the late 1950s in Ladakh and in the first seven months of 1962, the year both sides fought a bloody war in the high Himalaya.

THE PAST EXPERIENCE

On December 26, 1959 Peking (as Beijing was then known) sends a note to India talking about Aksai Chin. It says: "This area is the only traffic artery linking Singkiang to Western Tibet because to its north-east lies the great Gobi of Sinkiang through which direct traffic with Tibet is practically impossible...the area all along belonged to China." Any move by India to improve its military posture close to Aksai Chin will always invite Chinese ire, as it has been doing since the late 1950s. 

As Peking and New Delhi continued to exchange protest notes, 1962 began with fresh tension. 

Consider this:

Feb 22, 1962: India protests to China against advance patrolling by Chinese troops.  

March: New Delhi protests against establishment of a military post by China 6 miles west of Sumdo.

April-May 1962: Chinese troops step up advance patrolling in Chip Chap area

April 30, 1962: Peking orders patrolling in the sector from Karakoram Pass to Kongka Pass  and demands India withdraw 2 posts in the area.

May 2, 1962: China-Pakistan announce agreement to enter into 'negotiations to locate and align' the portion of India-China border west of Karakoram Pass in Kashmiri territory under Pakistan's unlawful occupation.

Mid-May, 1962: China sets up a new post in Indian territory 10 miles south-east of Spanggur.

Its not my case that events of 1962 will repeat themselves. Half a century later, the world has changed, India's military capability is far far better than it was then; And finally there is too much at stake for Beijing to launch any overt aggression.

What has however not changed is the Chinese tendency of bullying weaker neighbours and its policy to keep redefining 'core' interests according to circumstances. Policy making in China is one continuous process. In India on the other hand, it varies according to personalities and political parties in power.

While the military in India has overcome the trauma of the 1962 defeat, civilian policy makers appear to be still bogged down by the burdens of the past in dealing with China.
Of course, these mandarins get their act together only under pressure of a crisis like they did post-1986 Sumdorong Chu faceoff. The 2009 sanction for additional forces and speeding up of infrastructure development projects also came after increasing reports of Chinese belligerence along the LAC.

It is therefore essential to push for another round of capability-enhancing drive. The pending financial clearance for the Mountain Strike Corps must come quickly, even if it means brushing aside the rather silly query from the Finance Ministry which asked "would the Chinese threat persist after 2015?'  

Simultaneously, India must re-look and re-tweak its China policy. For instance:
  • Insist with Beijing the need for exchanging maps for all sectors immediately so that each side knows the other's claimed LAC and border negotiations can resume
  • Bring the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) under the operational control of the Army to ensure uniformity in border management
  • Ensure timely and effective information sharing mechanism with Indian media and through them the Indian people rather than let different stake holders speak in different and some times discordant voices during times of crisis
  • Educate and prepare the Indian people on the need for give and take on border negotiations in the future
Policy makers in India must  be mindful of the fact that military preparedness and trying to improve diplomatic relations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Monday, May 6, 2013

India-China standoff: A peep in the past and view from the current impasse

Found this from my visit to Chushul, Demchok, Pangong in Jan 2010: http://t.co/roo7mLdzwC. Even if I say it myself, instructive to watch
AND THIS ONE WRITTEN before THE STANDOFF ENDED
 FROM THE FAIR OBSERVER
 


The India-China Face-Off: Testing Times for the Indian Leadership

5 May 2013
Nitin Gokhale


For Nisar Ahmed, the sudden arrival of television crews into Leh, Ladakh’s capital, last week was disconcerting. As a top hotelier, he was sprucing up his two properties to get ready for domestic tourists who start flocking in droves to this high altitude desert. But last week he also had a small worry. A border incident in which Chinese troops had entered 19 km deep in the Indian Territory and stayed put, created quite an international stir.  For Ahmed, however, this was not new. What worried him, thought, was the hype.

“The tension that we see these days on the border is not new. In the past too, such incidents have happened but it has no affect on the local business. As far as the business in Leh and the tourism is concerned, it is quite smooth. However we would like that nothing more happens because the backbone of the economy of the Leh Ladhaki people is tourism, and [any] escalation of tensions might cause some decline in tourism which will affect the economy of the local people. I urge the media not to blow this out of proportion,” Ahmed said.

Ahmed and his fellow hoteliers are looking at the issue from a personal perspective but in the rest of India, China’s blatant act of aggression has caused outrage and anger. Predictably, political leaders in India have accused the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of being soft and indecisive. Mulayam Singh Yadav, a former defence minister and an ally of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) roared: "This government is cowardly, incompetent and good for nothing," he said, while objecting to the upcoming visit of External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid to China. Khurshid, who is expected to visit Beijing on May 9, is scheduled to meet his counterpart to finalise the agenda for new the Chinese Premier’s India visit in late May.

Describing China as the "biggest enemy", Mulayam Singh said in Lok Sabha (lower House of Parliament): "We have been warning that China has started occupying our territory. But [the] government is not listening to all this." 

Singh perhaps reflected the majority view in the country. China is seen as an aggressor by ordinary citizens; the perception mainly born out of the brief but brutal war the two countries fought way back in 1962 and the one India lost. Half a century later, the 4,000 km long boundary between the two across the Himalayas remains undemarcated, leading to frequent misunderstandings and intrusions by troops into each other’s perceived area.

Both sides have put in place several mechanisms to ensure that small incidents on the border do not get out of hand. In a break from the pattern, however, the Chinese troops have pitched tents and stayed on for more than two weeks, and thus posing a dilemma for Indian decision makers.

The latest flare up may, in fact, test the patience and resolve on both sides. On April 23, Syed Akbaruddin, spokesman for India's External Affairs Ministry, asked China to agree to a status quo even as he sought "time and space" for satisfactory resolution of the latest impasse on the border. His counterpart in Beijing, Hua Chunying, resorted to the usual rhetoric: "The two sides should work together to properly solve this issue left over from history through peaceful negotiations, so as to create good conditions for sound development of bilateral relations,’’ she said.

However, when the Chinese military put forward two pre-conditions at the flag meeting on April 23, it was clear that the PLA had intruded and camped in the Depsang area of the Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) sector with a definite plan. The Chinese military wanted India to stop building outposts and logistics depots in the vicinity and stop patrolling areas close to the perceived border before its troops went back; terms that India is unlikely to agree to. India, on the other hand, wants China to restore status quo as it existed in the area before April 15.

Srikanth Kondapalli, a foremost China watcher in India, and professor in Chinese Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, says: “The transgression incident and the bilateral responses indicated to the inability of the current mechanisms to deal effectively with any flare-ups on the borders. Indian responses to such incidents are pitched at three levels: political leaderships’ intervention; invoking diplomatic-bureaucratic procedures; and tactical conventional military preparations.”

Eventually, both sides may decide on a face saving compromise by agreeing to some of the points, but Beijing will use the latest episode to push for yet another bilateral mechanism for border management. Officers on the ground in Ladakh, say the present stand-off does not reflect any new policy but is part of the standard Chinese patrolling philosophy along the borders including the DBO. The Chinese will use this opportunity to revive a proposal put forward during Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie's visit last November, that to avoid such confrontations, the troops at the borders should advise each other of their patrolling programmes/schedules.

But why did the Chinese choose to come and camp in the DBO area? The DBO is an important area for India's defences, and was known even before the 1962 border war between the two nations. Located right in the middle of what is officially known as Sub Sector North (SSN), the DBO had a rough and ready airstrip available to Indian forces even before 1962. Located east of the Siachen glacier, the region is seen as strategically crucial for the Chinese, since the road that connects the two restive provinces in China — Tibet and Xingkiang — are very close to the area. China clearly wants to secure strategic depth to its civilian and military projects in the vicinity by pushing the Indian troops far away.

Despite its strategic location, Indian defence planners have tended to ignore infrastructure development of the area. Until recently, the DBO could be reached only by air. Troops deployed in the forward areas had to march for three days from Sasoma in Nubra Valley or along the Shyok River before reaching the DBO. Sources say, however, that recently a road along the Shyok River has been constructed to enable vehicular movement. The DBO airstrip, reactivated in 2008, is now able to handle AN 32 and hopefully the newly inducted C130 J medium lift aircraft. So far, the Indian Army deployment in the DBO area has been negligible. Instead, it is the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) which has been entrusted with the task of guarding this stretch of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

What next?
The army assesses that the stand-off might continue for weeks without either side blinking and, more importantly, without further escalation. Sources have ruled out any sort of military response to the incursion, but the Indian Army has ordered a re-assessment of vulnerable areas. But the longer the face off persists, the worse it is for the government since the perception that New Delhi is unable to deal with Beijing’s bullying tactics will only get reinforced with time.